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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

SALT LAKE CITY,
Plaintifl7Appellee,
v.
GARY ALLEN NEWMAN,

Case No. 20040452-CA

Defendant/Appellant

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Appellant/Defendant Gary Allen Newman ("Defendant") appeals from the denial
of his petition for extraordinary relief, entered by the Honorable J. Dennis Fredrick, Third
District Court, Salt Lake County, Utah. The Defendant contends that this Court has
jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (2002).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE, STANDARD OF REVIEW, PRESERVATION
Issue. Whether the district court properly denied and dismissed the Defendant's
petition for extraordinary relief where the Salt Lake City Justice Court performed its role
required under the Utah Constitution in ruling the Salt Lake City ordinance is not in
conflict with the Utah assault statute.
Standard of Review: When reviewing a district court's denial and dismissal of a
petition for extraordinary relief this Court reviews "the trial court's conclusions of law

for correctness and its factualfindingsfor plain error." State v. Rees. 2003 UT App. 4,
f3, 63 P.3d 120.
Preservation. This issue was preserved below. R. 1-26; 42-44.
RELEVANT RULE, STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Salt Lake City Code Section 11.08.020
Utah Code Ann. § 78-5-120(l)(3)
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 65B
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On or about March 20, 2003, the Defendant was arrested in Salt Lake City
("City55) for Battery in violation of Salt Lake City Code Section 11.08.020. R.2.
Defendant filed a motion to dismiss in the Salt Lake City Justice Court that claimed the
City's Battery ordinance to be unconstitutional and in conflict with the Utah's assault
statute. R. 3; 14-16; 17-20. Judge John L. Baxter of the Salt Lake City Justice Court
denied the motion because "the city ordinance [was] not in conflict with the state statue
because they share a common purpose and are closely related in subject matter." R. 1416. On February 11, 2004, the Defendant challenged the Justice Court's ruling by
petitioning the District Court for a writ of extraordinary relief pursuant to Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure 65B. R. 1. The Defendant claimed that the Justice Court's denial of the
motion to dismiss constituted a failure to perform an act required by the Utah
Constitution and abuse of discretion. R. 2-26. On March 18, 2004, the City filed a
Memorandum in Opposition to the Defendant's Petition for Extraordinary Relief that
argued the proper remedy was a trial de novo in the District Court. R. 34-39. On May
2

17, 2004, the District Court denied and dismissed the Defendant's petition, reasoning the
Justice Court fulfilled its Constitutional role in issuing a decision on the motion to
dismiss and a trial de novo was the appropriate method to challenge a Justice Court
ruling. R. 42-44.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On March 20, 2003, the City charged the Defendant with the domestic violence
offense of Battery in violation of Salt Lake City Code § 11.08.020 ("Battery Ordinance").
R.2. The charge resulted from the Defendant arguing with his estranged wife, Mrs.
Newman, over a rental car. R.3. Mrs. Newman asked the Defendant to leave. R.3. The
Defendant refused to leave and Mrs. Newman called the police. R.3. After the police
arrived, the Defendant attempted to grab the keys from Mrs. Newman's pants pocket.
R.3. The police intervened to prevent the Defendant from approaching Mrs. Newman.
R.3. After the police gained control of the Defendant, the police placed the Defendant
under arrest for battery pursuant to Salt Lake City Code § 11.08.020. R.3.
The Defendant challenged the battery charge byfilinga motion to dismiss before
the Salt Lake City Justice Court. R.3; 14-16; 17-20. The Defendant argued that the
conflict between the City's Battery ordinance and the Utah Assault statute rendered the
Battery ordinance unconstitutional. R.3.; 14-16; 17-20. The Justice Court issued a
timely ruling that denied the motion to dismiss. R. 14-16. The Justice Court held that the
City ordinance complemented the state statute because both laws share a common
purpose to further public safety. R. 14-16. The Defendant challenged the Justice Court's
ruling by petitioning the District Court for extraordinary relief under Utah Rule of Civil
3

Procedure 65B. R. 1. The District Court denied the Defendant's petition and dismissed
the matter. R. 42-44.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Rule 65B(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure permit an extraordinary writ
when a petitioner lacks any other "plain, speedy and adequate remedy." Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-5-120(l)(3) provides the appropriate remedy of a trial de novo in the District Court
for a defendant to challenge a Justice Court ruling. Before a defendant can challenge a
Justice Court ruling, the defendant must first exhaust his Justice Court remedies by
proceeding to trial. If the Justice Court trial results in an acquittal, then the issue of the
City ordinance's constitutionality becomes moot. The Defendant cannot circumvent the
proper Justice Court procedure by petitioning for an extraordinary writ when trial de
novo is the appropriate remedy.
Rule 65B(d) limits the grounds under which a Defendant may petition a court for
extraordinary relief. In addition to other grounds, a petitioner is entitled to a writ for
extraordinary relief when: (1) an inferior court exceeded its jurisdiction or abused its
discretion; or (2) failed to perform and act required by law as a duty of office. In this
case, the Justice Court did not abuse its discretion by denying the Defendant's motion to
dismiss. In addition, the Justice Court fulfilled its constitutionally mandated role by
issuing a decision on the Defendant's motion to dismiss. The fact that the Defendant
disagrees with the Justice Court decision does not constitute an abuse of discretion or
breach of duty.
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Moreover, the City's Battery ordinance is not in conflict with the Utah Assault
statute since both complement and further a common purpose and subject matter. The
Utah Legislature granted municipalities the authority to enact ordinances necessary and
proper to provide for the safety of the city and its inhabitants so long as they are not
repugnant to law. However, the Utah Legislature did not assert that any inconsistency
between municipal ordinances and state laws automatically void the municipal ordinance.
Municipal ordinances do not conflict with state statutes when they share a
common purpose and are closely related in subject matter. The City's Battery ordinance
is consistent with and related to the subject matter of the Utah Assault statute. Both share
the common purpose of defining a "willful and unlawful use of force or violence upon
the person of another" as assaultive conduct. The City's Battery ordinance does not
impose a greater penalty than the Utah assault statute. Rather, the City ordinance created
an offense for lesser conduct. Therefore, the City's ordinance and the State's statute are
complementary and further the same purpose to preserve the public peace.
ARGUMENT
L THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY DENIED THE DEFENDANT'S WRIT,
BECAUSE A TRIAL DE NOVO IN DISTRICT COURT IS THE STATUTORY
MANDATED METHOD TO APPEAL A JUSTICE COURT DECISION.
Rule 65B(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure permit a petitioner to seek an
extraordinary writ when the petitioner lacks any other "plain, speedy and adequate
remedy." A criminal defendant has an appropriate remedy to challenge Justice Court
decisions, after afindingof guilty or an entry of a guilty plea, by seeking a trial de novo
in the District Court. Utah Code Ann. § 78-5-120(l)(3). The Utah Court of Appeal
5

upheld the constitutionality of the de novo appeal processfromJustice Courts. State v.
Hinson, 966 P.2d 273, (Utah Ct App. 1998); see also, State v. Stirba, 972 P.2d 918, 919
(Utah Ct. App. 1998) (a writ may not substitute for an appeal). Under Utah law, a
ciiminal defendant must first exhaust his Justice Court remedies that include a trial before
seeking District Court review. The Justice Court's rejection of the Defendant's argument
that the City's ordinance unconstitutionally conflicts with the State statute can be
reviewed by the District Court at a trial de novo. If the Justice Court acquits the
Defendant, then the issue of the constitutionality of the battery charge becomes moot. In
the present case, the Defendant is attempting to improperly use a writ to circumvent the
proper appellate process of a trial de novo.
H. THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED THE DEFENDANT'S
PETITION FOR EXTRAORDINARY RELIEF WHERE SALT LAKE CITY'S
BATTERY ORDINANCE COMPLEMENTS, RATHER THAN CONFLICTS, WITH
UTAH'S ASSAULT STATUTE.
Under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 65B(d)(2), a petitioner is entitled to a writ for
extraordinary relief only under the following conditions:
a. Where an inferior court, administrative agency, or officer exercising judicial
functions has exceeded its jurisdiction or abused its discretion;
b. Where an inferior court, administrative agency, corporation, or person has
failed to perform an act required by law as a duty of office, trust or station;
c. Where an inferior court, administrative agency, corporation or person has
refused the petitioner the use or enjoyment of a right or office to which the
petitioner is entitled; or
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d. Where the Board of Pardons and Parole has exceeded its jurisdiction or failed
to perform an act required by constitutional or statutory law.
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 65B(d)(2)(B-D) are inapplicable to the Defendant's
situation. There has been no failure to perform an act required by law as a duty of office,
trust or station, there has been no refusal to the petitioner of the use or enjoyment of a
right or office to which the petitioner is entitled and the Board of Pardons and Parole is
not involved in the present case in any way. A writ is an inappropriate remedy in the
present case because the Justice Court judge neither exceeded his jurisdiction nor abused
his discretion. Therefore, the District Court properly denied the Defendant's petition for
extraordinary relief.
The Defendant claims that the Justice Court "abused its discretion" by holding that
the City ordinance did not unconstitutionally conflict with the State statute. Under the
Defendant's reasoning, a Justice Court is barred from rendering any decision on
constitutional grounds, because if the Justice Court finds a statute constitutional and
permits the City to prosecute pursuant to the statute, then the Justice Court "abused its
discretion." The Justice Court properly exercised its duty and discretion by finding the
City ordinance constitutional.
A. Salt Lake City's Battery Ordinance is Constitutional and Furthers the Purpose of
Utah's Assault Statute
A municipality possesses the authority to pass ordinances necessary and proper to
provide for the safety of the city and its inhabitants so long as they are not repugnant to
law. Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-84. A city ordinance and a state statute are not in conflict
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when both the city ordinance and the state statute share a common purpose and both are
closely related in subject matter. Salt Lake City v. Allred, 437 P.2d 434 (Utah 1968). A
municipal ordinance conflicts with a general law if the ordinance "forbids that which the
statute permits;5 Richfield City v. Walker, 790 P.2d 87, 91 (Utah Ct App. 1990).
Salt Lake City Ordinance § 11.08.020 is clearly consistent with and related to the
subject matter of Utah Code Ann. §76-5-102. Both share the common purpose of
defining a "willful and unlawful use offeree or violence upon the person of another" as
assaultive conduct" and therefore are in harmony. The City ordinance does not prohibit
conduct that the State statute permits. The Utah legislature has not passed a statute that
permits "willful and unlawful use of force or violence upon the person of another."
Rather, both laws prohibit violent behavior directed at another person. The City
ordinance merely grants more protection to its citizens than the state statute. Based on
the analysis as set forth in Alfred, the city ordinance is a valid exercise of municipal
power and complements the State statute.
Moreover, the only requirement for a valid ordinance is that the ordinance not be
"repugnant to law." Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-84 (2000). It seems clear based on this
language the legislature was attempting to ensure a municipality would not be allowed to
pass an ordinance prohibited by state law. In fact, nowhere in this grant of power does
the legislature assert that any inconsistency between municipal ordinances and state laws
automatically void the municipal ordinance. The Battery ordinance in question makes it
a crime to use unlawful and willfiil force or violence on another. This is a vahd exercise
of the City's power to provide for the safety, peace and good order of the city and its
8

inhabitants. Salt Lake City Code § 11.08.020, by its oWn language was created for the
purposes allowed under Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-84, is not repugnant to law, and is
therefore a valid exercise of the power granted the municipality under § 10-8-84.
Moreover, a municipal ordinance is constitutional "where the ordinance
presecribe[s] a smaller penalty" compared to the state statute. Alfred, 437 P.2d at 436. In
this case, the City's Battery statute created an offense for lesser conduct. By strictly
applying the reasoning of Alfred to the matter at bar, the City would never be able to
create an offense that had not already been created by the state legislature. However, this
result conflicts with the purpose of Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-84 that permits a municipality
to criminalize conduct that the State has not criminalized. Salt Lake City Code
§ 11.08.020 merely extends more protection to its citizens not by expanding the state
statute, but by narrowing the behavior allowed. Salt Lake City Code § 11.08.020 is
therefore a valid exercise of authority under Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-84.
B. The Justice Court Fulfilled Its Duty to Issue a Decision on the Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss. The Justice Court Properly Exercised Its Discretion by Deciding that the Salt
Lake City Ordinance Constitutionally Complements the Utah Assault Statute.
Under Rule of Civil Procedure 65B(d)(2), an inferior court properly exercises its
duty and discretion by issuing a decision. Stirba, 972 P.2d 918. A court does not neglect
its duty or abuse discretion when the Defendant disagrees with the court's decision. Id. at
921.
In Stirba, the Utah Court of Appeals properly held that a writ of mandamus was
inappropriate where a judge performed an act required by law, but did not perform it to
the satisfaction of the petitioner. Id. Likewise, the Justice Court judge performed the act
9

required by the Constitution when he reached a ruling on the merits of the Defendant's
motion. The judge's decision, however, rejected the Defendant's arguments in the
motion to dismiss. It is improper for the Defendant to use an extraordinary writ to
challenge that decision. As noted in Stirba, a writ is appropriate to direct an inferior
court to perform an act, but not proper to direct the court to exercise discretion in a
particular way. Id, at 921. The Defendant's petition for a writ improperly petitioned the
District Court to direct the Justice Court's discretion.
Defendant's reliance on Dean v. Henriod, 975 P.2d 946 (Utah Ct. App. 1999) is
without merit. In Henriod, the defendant claims an abuse of discretion by the District
Court judge. The Utah Court of Appeals agreed that because there was an alleged abuse
of discretion of the district court judge, a writ was a proper remedy to review the alleged
abuse of discretion. Id, at 949. In contrast, the Justice Court committed no abuse of
discretion. After the submission and review of written arguments, the Justice Court heard
several oral arguments regarding the validity of the City's Battery ordinance and then
issued Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. At no time did the Justice Court exceed
its jurisdiction nor abuse it discretion. Therefore, the District Court properly dismissed
the Defendant's petition for extraordinary relief.
CONCLUSION
The Appellee, the City, respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district
court's denial of the Defendant's petition for extraordinary relief.
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SUBMITTED this

T6

day of November, 2004.

DOUGLAS A. JOHNSON"
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee
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I DOUGLAS A. JOHNSON certify I have caused to be delivered the original and
seven copies of the foregoing to the Utah Court of Appleas, 450 South State Street, 5th
Floor, P.O. Box 140230, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0230, and four copies to the Salt
Lake Legal Defender Association's office, 424 East 500 South, Suite 300, Salt Lake City,
Utah 84111, this

day of November, 2004.

DOUGLAS A. JOHNSON
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